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It seems that one of the most central problems of political philosophy is the relation 
of subjects to their community – while one can hardly think of that community in 
terms of a meta- or mega-subject, the question of which status one is to attribute to it 
remains, i.e. what exactly it is, how it is being constituted, what effects it has on the 
individual subjects. The route commonly taken to explore that relation is to examine 
the – supposedly – constitutive role which community plays for the individual 
subjects. Insofar as one assumes that it is in fact a constitutive role, this role can 
consist either in an originary constitution of individual identities by the community 
or in the essential and irreducible transformation of those identities, where the latter 
could still be constituted extra- or prepolitically. The argument then focuses on a 
concrete model of this process, and in fact mostly on the respective shares and 
eventual priorities of individual and collective contributions, maybe additionally on 
the relation between politics and law. Obviously (and in my eyes quite rightfully), 
the polis can hardly be eliminated from the core of political discourse or of 
philosophical discourse about politics. 
For about 20 years, Jean-Luc Nancy has presented a whole series of works that 
reflect on this irreducibility while demonstrating that this reflection can and must be 
intertwined with an elaboration of the problematic of the concept of ‘community’. In 
what follows, I will try to present Nancy’s argument, which pushes the logic of a 
certain critique of community (namely that of a critique of totalitarianism) to an 
ontological radicalization that finally engenders a critical reflection even of 
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democracy. However, my aim is to also show – against a common interpretation of 
Nancy – that there remains more than just a turning away from politics and from the 
political, and probably even more than a merely negative politics.1 After having 
drawn the main lines of Nancy’s community-skeptical argument and having 
confronted it with a critique that asks for potential consequences resulting for 
political actors (I), I am going to examine a couple of Nancy’s more recent texts2 and 
see if they contain any precisions, extensions or revisions in comparison with the 
analysis up to that point. I will proceed by first specifying the ‘negative politics’ up 
to the point of asking if it is maybe even an ‘anti-politics’ that Nancy suggests, and 
then explaining the transition from an ontology of being-with to a ‘theory of 
communicative praxis’ as I would like to provisionally call it (II). In the last part of 
this essay I am going to pursue what could be a ‘rehabilitation of politics’ and 
discuss how that could be thought and connected to the previous analysis (III). I am 
going to argue that in the end, Nancy will have us provided with two strands of 
argument that are promising, but remain to be elaborated: On the one hand, a detailed 
conception of communication will have been presented, the political consequences of 
which need to be worked out, on the other hand, we will see a more ‘properly’ 
political conception of democracy that is centered around justice, but which still 
remains all too superficial.
I
For a start, I understand Nancy’s argument as criticizing a thought that sees politics 
as a form or an expression of an identity. Such a thought understands (at least 
essential moments of) politics as concerning the relation between some collective 
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form of life of a group of individuals and their practical-political judgment, the latter 
having its condition of possibility or at least of intelligibility in the context of those 
collective convictions and practices. Insofar as the individual decisions and 
judgments thus reflect their communal context, any concrete decision or judgment is 
a more or less direct expression of common judgments, values and convictions, the 
individual expression of the community. That might not yet mean that there is an 
identity or even a subsumption of individual and community, but there is definitely 
something going on that can be described as expression, (re-)presentation or 
embodiment of a (collective) identity by means of another (individual) entity or 
identity. In most of the discussion, then, it is not the concept of collective identity as 
such that seems at issue, but rather the exact properties of that ‘expression’. 
Nancy’s critique on the other hand can show that such a shift of focus from the 
individual to the community tends towards a model of identity politics that both has 
to exclude individual particularities (especially those that are perceived as being in 
conflict with the supposed collective ethos), at least in the form of a social 
sanctioning of non-virtuous moments, and to maintain itself only by emphasizing its 
boundaries, i.e. by negating other identities or communities. The latter aspect finds a 
radicalization in theories that presuppose a necessity of ‘inventing’ an exterior foe, 
the former in a model that Nancy calls the ‘work’ (œuvre) of the community or 
‘community-as-work’. For this model, the supposition of a (to-be-expressed) identity 
immanent to the community leads to the political project of unfolding that identity, 
that is to say to the appeal addressed to the community and to its members of putting 
this identity to work, of expressing it as free from distortions as possible and of 
realizing, producing it in the world – eventually even by eliminating and ‘cleaning 
out’ those moments that are strangers to this identity in each of its concretizations. 
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Politics then becomes a matter ‘of discovering the immanent or implicit identity of a 
group and setting it to work, drawing it out and allowing it to express itself in 
functional activity’ as Norris points out.3 As far as this critique of real or virtual 
exclusion and repression is concerned, the question of whether this common identity 
is understood as being natural and pre-given or as being laid in the hands of the 
community itself which would have to politically invent and institute it, is secondary. 
Both of these understandings contain the germ of totalitarianism.4 For Nancy, our 
‘overcoming’ of totalitarianism can be a postponement or an enclosure at best, unless 
we stop confronting it with just another community based on an essential set of 
values and norms, as much as these may in fact be ‘better’, i.e. more inclusive, more 
universal, maybe more procedural values and norms than those on which totalitarian 
regimes are based. The problem lies in the very concept of a community possessing a 
certain essence, and it surfaces as soon as one is in some way using this concept (as 
soon as one tries to strengthen the role of community, to identify with it, to build a 
political order on it etc.).5 
Now, Nancy’s theory can take a counter-position to such an understanding of the 
relation of political community and its members without having to put forward an 
atomistic individualism, because it does not take the Hegelian critique of such 
individualism as its point of departure, but rather the Heideggerian existential 
analytics. Thus it can suppose that the relations are in a way prior and constitutive to 
the individual subjects, without having to postulate their Aufhebung in a community 
that would be a subject of a higher order. While under the title of being-in-common6 
this theory confers fundamental (existential) significance to the fact that a lonesome 
existence and a completely autonomous subject are contradictions in terms, the role 
that it provides for relationality and plurality is so ‘profound’ that they are below or 
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prior to every identity, and so below or prior to a collective identity as well. In fact, 
they are ‘profound’ in an absolute sense, withdrawing even from being a foundation 
for something else.7 The focus is not on the constitution of identity – maybe 
following the more or less ‘structural’ model of a dialectical constitution of identity 
by the negation of its negation – but on a more or less ‘ontological’ analysis of that 
which has to happen so that something can be, can appear, can come into the world 
in the first place. Or, more specifically: What has to happen so that something – 
someone – can experience herself as being put ‘there’ in the world, and maybe ‘later’ 
develop an identity or subjectivity? This is being-in-common: Dasein is Da-Sein, 
because it is always already exposed – it is just appearing, but this already means 
appearing for and in front of others. The mutual exposition of beings and the 
unavailability of that relation (exposition-appearance) is what ‘makes’ the 
appearance. That which appears is marked from the outset by its opening to others, 
or better: that which appears does so, i.e. it is by and in that very opening for others. 
Thus, by this existential being-outside-itself, it is constituted as essentially 
unessential, dependent, affectable and ‘vulnerable’. But the relation of being-exposed 
is not only unavailable and able to affect or touch the singular appearing being, it is 
also empty: Neither threat nor coining of some passive, receptive matter or identity, 
it is nothing but the mere fact that there are several beings near one another, nothing 
but the empty ‘between’ between multiple beings. The singular being is by openness 
for others – and these others are at the same time, with the same ‘move’ – but yet 
they are different.8 Thus, being is always already being-with and the ontological basis 
of any individuation is a community of sorts, but this community precisely has no 
identity, no substance, it is not defined by its history, by one or a set of interests, by a 
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certain language game or by a set of values, convictions and practices, it is the mere 
fact of the plurality of beings. 
But if you confront this ontological analysis with the need of politically dealing 
with individual praxis and its necessary heterogeneous plurality, e.g. by constructing 
a legislative will and a resulting order of the common, then it becomes manifest that 
Nancy may have good reasons to criticize the homogeneity and transparency that 
such a construction presupposes, but that he has little to offer in terms of how to 
actually deal with political decisions. In fact, Nancy’s deconstruction of communal 
binding powers tends to do away with political projects as such and to understand 
individual freedom as something that has to be coordinated collectively in the most 
modest manner possible. While a ‘liberal’ ontology – i.e. the conception of 
prepolitically constituted individual subjects that negotiate their autonomous interests 
rationally as soon as they ‘enter’ a political context – seems to be inadequate, it could 
turn out that any inference of a political project from an ontology of being-in-
common is in fact impossible and ends up being totalitarian, and that in the end a 
‘liberal’ politics is the most appropriate one.9 For a politically interested philosophy 
this is hardly satisfying, of course: 
This produces a political philosophy that is, however theoretically 
brilliant, strangely removed from the political. [...] To say of decision 
that it is empty, and radically undetermined, makes politics seem 
arbitrary and haphazard – indeed, it may actually encourage it to be so. It 
is true that we cannot appeal to law for the justification of all of our 
judgments. This is why we must take responsibility for them. [...] But it 
does not follow from this that they are radically or completely 
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“ungrounded”, as Nancy claims. It is surely correct to say that “We have 
to decide on contents and norms.” But contents and norms are in a 
reciprocal relation with judgments: our choices of them are made on the 
basis of other contents and norms to which we are already committed. 
Decision is never absolute, for it always presupposes such prior 
commitments. (Norris, p. 285)
Now Nancy can rightfully claim to see this reciprocity well, to accord great value to 
the ‘a-priori-commitment’ that one’s mere existence means, and to go at lengths in 
explaining how it should be understood, and how the obligation of a ‘commitment’ 
can be understood in the first place. For this always already accepted, but only 
‘quasi-normative’ commitment of existence implies at least the resistance to take part 
in the project of a common identity that would suppress our ontologically plural and 
heterogeneous being-in-common. Additionally, Nancy can point the critic to his 
effort of clarifying the exact character of responsibility – i.e. what exactly it means 
that ‘we must take responsibility for them’ and why we must do so and in the face of 
whom or what. But when Nancy says (in The Inoperative Community) that 
‘“political” would mean a community ordering itself to the unworking of its 
communication, or destined to this unworking: a community undergoing the 
experience of its sharing.’ (p. 40), then it is patent that such a quasi-normative 
principle is indeed of a mostly negative character, i.e. that it merely reminds us of the 
limits of possible reasonable and adequate commitments, but in no way specifies 
what our positive commitments should be. A maybe even more fundamental 
difficulty could be if Nancy were to say that the problem of political judgment as a 
problem would only arise in the context of an ambition for autonomy, self-
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transparency and self-sufficiency, but also for knowledge and control of the world, 
an ambition which in itself already conceals the pluralistic flow of appearing and 
disappearing of fragmentary entities. Then the truly self-conscious ‘community’ (or 
better: the ‘community’ which would truly be ‘conscious of being’) and its praxis, 
respectively the truly authentic being-in-common would have to be understood in 
terms of a final overcoming of politics or as an already more or less apolitical praxis 
of radical opening for the occurring and emerging being(s).10
II
As a next step, I want to show how a more detailed description of Nancy’s 
arguments, which also makes reference to more recent texts, seems at first to confirm 
the mentioned concerns, but then opens way for what I provisionally would like to 
call a ‘theory of communicative praxis’ which provides answers that are, so to say, at 
an angle to those concerns. 
But let us start with the beginning:11 In Nancy’s account of the Athenian co-
originarity of philosophy and politics, the Athenian polis could be taken as practical 
achievement of man, who was zoon politikon insofar as he was anthropos logikos, 
and correspondingly the polis would appear as the practical achievement of the 
logos; then philosophy, being the articulation of the ‘cosmic’ logos, appeared in a 
way as the ideal subject of politics. At the same time the polis, the assembly of 
deliberating citizens was the subject of philosophy. Our present constellation, 
thought all the way down, is then radically – and doubly – different: By not realizing 
a rational, harmonious order but rather the heterogeneous plurality of differences, 
contemporary politics can no longer count as an achievement of philosophy (or as an 
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achievement at all), which in turn has itself lost or has been abandoned by the logos 
and which can no longer even think itself as being on the quest of founding the 
practical order. Both in politics and in philosophy then, there is no rational 
(‘cosmological’) order left, no essence, no foundation and no 
reconciling/accomplishing subjectivity – only the plurality of contingencies which 
have to be taken seriously as originary and justified in themselves.12 
To hold fast onto an intertwining of philosophy and politics grounded in their 
essence, an intertwining of origin and destination, of ground, community and thought 
is thus possible only at the price of a denial of this disintegration of the origin of 
commonality and of order. But the disintegration or dis-position of inessential 
plurality would find a return in such a denial, perverted to exclusion and oppression – 
thus Nancy’s theory in fact results in a merely negative imperative to resist such 
exclusion and to insist on an equal inclusion of all.13 But for the politically interested 
philosophy, there is worse to come: Just as aporetic and as fatal as that horizon of 
philosophico-politics has proven to be, just as usual remains a perspective on politics 
that still subscribes to it, or that at least has only to some extent broken with it. Even 
a conception of democracy that understands and aims at democracy as an institution 
of an unspecified and unspecifiable meaning and of an orientability that has to be 
kept open, in the end brings the sacrifice of eliminating or at least concealing the 
‘common sense’ by its theoretical and idealistic strictness and thus fails to fully do 
justice to the being-in-common, Nancy explains (cf. SW, pp. 88-93). This means a 
heavy burden for the diverse attempts to think the political, a burden which may have 
its ground in the concept of the political.14 Consequently, for Nancy, the question of 
politics is the following one: 
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If sovereignty is the grand, political term for defining community [...] 
that has nothing beyond itself, what becomes of sovereignty when it is 
revealed that it is nothing but a singular plural spacing? How is one to 
think sovereignty as the “nothing” of the “with” that is laid bare? At the 
same time, if political sovereignty has always signified the refusal of 
domination [...], how is one to think the bare sovereignty of the “with” 
against domination, whether this is the domination of being-together by 
some other means or the domination of togetherness by itself (by the 
regulation of its “automatic” control)?
In one way or another, bare sovereignty [...] presupposes that one take a 
certain distance from the politico-philosophical order and from the realm 
of “political philosophy” [...] in order to engage in a thinking, the site of 
which is the very constitution, imagination, and signification of the 
political, which allows this thinking to retrace its path in its retreat and 
beginning from this retreat. The retreat of the political does not signify 
the disappearance of the political. It only signifies the disappearance of 
the philosophical presupposition of the whole politico-philosophical 
order, which is always an ontological presupposition. (BSP, pp. 36-37 
(transl. mod.))
So, how is sovereignty to be thought as presentation of being-with, how is it to be 
thought as being put up against domination? This is a matter of investigating 
sovereignty without turning to any category modeled after classical political 
(subject-)categories, a matter of exploring an apolitical sovereignty. The ‘question of 
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the political’ (or the ‘question of politics’ for that matter) under the condition of the 
retreat of the political, i.e. in our present modern condition then changes from a 
genitivus subiectivus to a genitivus obiectivus, i.e. the concepts of politics and of the 
political altogether are at disposal. Inasmuch as this does not aim at ‘another 
politics’, but at a certain praxis and ethos,15 and inasmuch as the subsumption of 
politics and of the political under the verdict of philosophico-political is consistent, 
we can call Nancy’s project even an ‘anti-politics’. In fact, in this interpretation 
politics is actually ‘devoted to its own erasure’ (Norris, p. 289), for it is the 
disclosure and the unfolding of the originary distancedness which makes every 
politics absurd. On the other hand, as a differentiated tradition of western Marxism16 
bears witness, while such an anti-political thinking may well lack operativeness or 
potential for instrumentality, it need not necessarily be an apolitical thinking. For 
already the mere utopia of a society or community free of politics – however obscure 
it may be in each concrete case – has a meaning that affects present concrete politics 
in one way or another, although that is probably not to be deployed in the present 
context.
But at least we should thus far agree with a critique that alleges a lack of an 
adequate taking into account of the inevitability, of the productivity and of the 
dignity of politics.17 However, while I go along with that critical intuition, I doubt 
that the burden of proof that such a critique must cope with has sufficiently been met: 
The critique namely has either to give reasons for the supposed ‘necessity’ of 
political judgment without reintroducing essential categories (like e.g. antagonality) 
to the ontology of being-with, or to explain the ‘dignity’ of political judgment, of 
political commitment and of the political as such in some other way, again without 
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presenting it like some quasi-tragedy of intended rational treatment of aporias and 
differends. 
But maybe we do not have to push the critique this far and can instead try and put 
at least the praxis of the ‘sovereignty of the with’ into a relation to the political and 
study what the explication of such a relation would mean for a conception of politics. 
Then, let us concede to Nancy: Sovereignty can no longer even be a concept grasping 
the essential autonomy of a community – for the simple reason that there is no such 
thing. That is to say, sovereignty can no longer be a concept describing a community 
that declares its self-availability, its self-transparency and its bounds as its essential 
and distinctive (virtual) ‘properties’, a community that imposes a common and self-
donated order on itself as its own unfinished and unfinishable project and that 
understands or even invents itself by means of this project. If we still (with Nancy) 
want to maintain that ‘sovereignty’ should describe that which articulates the being-
in-common of a community of singulars and if we want to maintain that it be 
possible to confront any domination of this community by something else than this 
plural common being with ‘sovereignty’, then that ‘sovereignty’ will have to be 
spelled out as a praxis that on the one hand ‘does justice’ to the naked with of the 
being-with and that on the other hand, while remaining fully present and effective, 
withdraws rather principally from any domination: A praxis which undermines and 
maybe hinders or prevents domination, which fights and which fragments 
domination or which maybe opens domination (for domination’s own 
‘undominatingness’, for the undominated and for the undominating). Then the with is 
the criterion of adequacy, even of justice itself and it is that which permits, inspires, 
explains and gives reason to the mentioned imperative of equality (or fraternity). The 
praxis of such a sovereignty would be ‘apolitical’ inasmuch as it would not weigh in 
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a power- or autonomy-oriented context. But it would be ‘political’ inasmuch as it 
would cross every such context, inasmuch as, while it could not be brought to bear 
directly against domination, it still would have destabilizing effects on domination. 
This praxis may then well be the ‘most political’ that Nancy is able to think in the 
framework of his approach, but how exactly does he think it? Only when this 
question is answered, if both the ‘political’ and the ‘apolitical’ dimensions of that 
praxis have been tied to a specific conception of it, only then can we judge the 
political or a-political or anti-political character of Nancy’s theory. And another step 
back: How is that constellation of the with to be described, that is supposed to be 
reflected in the mentioned praxis?
While the plural singulars are well defined, for what concerns us here, they are so 
merely as ‘anyones’, as the full and concrete beings that they all each are – and ‘all’ 
means here: all that are there with or near one another or at the same time, i.e. 
absolutely all, there is no other, no outside, in distinction to which a ‘common’ of 
this community could be delineated.18 Also the link or connection of the singuli is not 
apt to assert a common essence, but pure accident. It is the mere at-the-same-time-in-
the-same-place of several singulars, the time and place of which are realized as well 
only in or through the common appearance, i.e. in/through/as the mutual exteriority 
and exposition, in/through/as the mutual contact and affectability of the singulars and 
in/through/as their respective openings. According to recent texts the spatial 
character of com-pearance can be further emphasized, for if Dasein is being there, 
then this there can only mean: there, put before ‘us’ to see (ek-sisting), at a concrete 
place, tied in distances to other concrete singulars and in a space that is stretched out 
by those distances, i.e. by the compearance of plural singulars. Compearance: If 
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there is something or someone, there is ‘always already’ many, that ‘always already’ 
concern, touch, confront, flee one another.19 
Far from being a mere impoverished and inert objectivity offered up to 
the purposes and the manipulations of humanity, this factuality, or the 
world as being-here of all the beings-here, is itself also, qua simple 
being-thrown-here-of-things, an existentiale of Dasein. (SW, p. 57)
It is a matter of taking seriously both the spatiality and the materiality of the ‘being-
thrown-here-of-things’ (which is an expression that, in spite of all due seriousness, 
should reveal a good deal of self-irony from the part of this ontologist). Ontology has 
to be understood less as a logic than as a sort of materialism. Already compearance’s 
materiality is, following Nancy, everything but a closed and indistinct immanence, 
rather is it the difference which makes the appearance of any thing whatsoever 
possible, inasmuch as it is an originary expansion and divergence.
If Dasein must be characterized by its Jemeinigkeit […], by the 
singularity of someone having or making sense of “mineness” (or 
ipseity), this someone would be unthinkable without the material-
transcendental (existential) resource that the some-oneness of the thing in 
general is, without the reality of the res as material difference. Matter 
means here: the reality of the difference – and différance – by which 
there is some thing(s) and not merely the identity of a pure inherence [...]. 
Real difference, difference of the res: if there is something, there are 
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several things; otherwise, there is nothing, no “there is”. Reality is the 
reality of the several things there are; necessarily numerous reality. (SW, 
pp. 57f. (transl. mod.))
To acknowledge this materiality means not to ignore the material surfaces of things, 
their contacts and their distances; paying heed to it opens access to resources of 
difference and différance, but also to resources of mutual contact and affection, 
resources that are beyond subjectivist or idealist ambitions of appropriation and that 
expose a net-like or rhyzomatic transitivity.20 The (existentially) first theme of every 
being is no inertia or inherence of any sorts, but first of all the distancing ‘giving’ or 
the ‘giving’ that resides in the distance, the ‘taking place’, ‘Statt haben’, ‘Y-avoir-
lieu’. Nancy calls this existential ‘worldliness’.21 The ‘taking place’ is the quod and 
the quomodo of that very quod (if one can say so) at the same time:
The there of the “there is” is nothing but spacing as such […] As such, 
then, the there is nothing other than the Wittgensteinian “That” of the 
world, while at the same time being the world’s original “how”. In the 
there, the “that” and the “how” of the world [‘“que” et “comment” ça fait 
monde’, A.W.] coincide. It is not a place of places, or a sensorium Dei, 
or an a priori form. More likely, it would be a priori matter – but here the 
a priori, in its act of birth, would be the sensible entelechy itself: the 
unity, opened within itself, of the touched/touching. (SW, p. 159)
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The world is at first the totality of the net of contacts and distances, of moments of 
pressure and of traction, of weights and extensions. Its appearing is a spreading and 
unfolding as well as an aperture, a divide and a leakage, a description that Nancy 
seeks to clarify with the category of areality of singular plural being.22 But as soon as 
we are talking more specifically about the Dasein, i.e. the being that experiences 
itself as there, right in this world, then we have to think about perception and the – 
possible, aspired, evaded or factual – touching as a material-corporal link of beings, 
and as the evidence of their mutual delimitation, and as their mutual 
exposition/affectability. Touching has to be understood as the factum of being-with, 
but just as well as the facere of it, as praxis of being-with, for it links the materiality 
of sensual perception of being-in-common’s areality to the creation of this very 
(dis-)assembly and to the manifest, even understandable exposition of singular-plural 
being. Introducing the subject of language at this point, Nancy can give that 
argument its full weight, for in this perspective the exposition par excellence is 
provided by language which is both in the world of material differences (as sound, 
patterns of writing etc.) and outside of it (as meaning). By recognizing the outside of 
the world inside of it, one is confronted immediately with the plural singular being, 
its relationality and its ‘transimmanence’,23 but one is confronted with it as 
something that is ‘in retreat’. It is then no wonder that writing is presented once more 
as paradigmatic model of communication, i.e. as that understanding of language that 
maintains a revealing as well as a binding and relating power and at the same time 
makes the unavailability and indefiniteness of each of its terms and poles plain to 
see.24 But before discussing how this praxis of being-with is to be assessed from a 
political angle and even before the objection is raised that touching or writing may 
well be forms of praxis, but hardly an ethos (let alone a politics), I would like to twist 
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the issue once more: For what is this supposed to mean, the touching or writing 
exposes the singular-plural being? 
As we have seen, insofar as the delimitation is the limit of the extension of single 
fragments and their contact with or by another, it ‘makes’ the ‘there are’ of things; 
but this very same delimitation, insofar as it is a kind of split (self-unavailability, 
disjointing, finiteness), contains the reference of this fragment to another fragment 
and the latter’s (different and itself in turn singular) sharing of that same split, of the 
very same distance and the very same fracture. He or she who can ‘read’ such a 
reference, and who has a ‘sense’ for such a reference, i.e. he or she who is more or 
less ‘at home’ in the space of imagination, of symbols and of language, will 
comprehend the boundary as the exposition of the ‘making’ the ‘with’ that is in the 
‘there are’. And ‘exposition’ here gets a specific meaning: It (re)presents the sharing 
of a nothing, of a lack or of a gap – of the nothing that ‘generates’ the plurality of 
singular-plural being and that ‘makes’ the with of the being-with. And this 
(re)presentation corresponds exactly to Nancy’s concept of the symbolic:25
The proper value of symbolism is in making a symbol, that is, in making 
a connection or a joining, and in giving a face [figure] to this liaison by 
making an image. Insofar as the relation is imagined [se représente], and 
because the relation as such is nothing other than its own representation, 
the symbolic is what is real in such a relation. By no means, however, is 
such a relation the representation of something that is real (in the 
secondary, mimetic sense of representation), but the relation is, and is 
nothing other than, what is real in the representation – its effectiveness 
and its efficacy. […] The sole criterion of symbolization is [...] the 
- 17 / 30 -
capacity for allowing a certain play, in and by the image-symbol, with 
the joining, the distancing, the opened interval that articulates it as sym-
bol: this word simply means “put with” [...]. Therefore, the “symbolic” is 
not simply an aspect of being-social: on the one hand, it is this Being 
itself; on the other hand, the symbolic does not take place without 
(re)presentation, the (re)presentation of one another [des uns aux autres] 
according to which they are with one another [les-uns-avec-les-autres]. 
(BSP, pp. 57f.)
Nancy has developed a complex critique of the ‘mimetic conception of 
representation’ that is quite important to him:26 Representation is not to be 
understood as the reflection of some absent thing that would be primary, genuine and 
authentic, but rather it is the ‘presencing something’, making an appearance, a 
staging, beyond the ideal-/material-dichotomy and beyond the dichotomy of true 
being/mere façade. Representation is at the same time imaginary, actual, and 
effective. Thus, a representation of the bonds of being-with in the sense of 
presencing, symbolizing and signifying is not as much its reproduction and its 
replication for the ensuing theoretical and practical treatment, as it is the very 
binding of that tie, (another) praxis of being-with. 
But now it follows from what has been said, that only a symbolism that 
emphasizes its own fragmentariness is adequate to itself and can represent/‘make’ the 
with.27 ‘In a paradoxical way, it is precisely when the symbolic order is interrupted 
that it arrives at its own essence.’ (SW, p. 136), that is to say that only an interrupted 
symbolic order touches the representation of a tie, the ‘let-emerge’ of being which is 
always already being-with. Then it is the praxis of a certain, ‘fractal’ use of symbol-
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images, of a ‘fractal’ writing that does justice to the with of the being-with. Not a 
certain politics, but a certain language, a certain style.28
But how can any style be the sovereignty that is a detriment to domination, that 
undermines or even opposes domination? If the political impact of language, writing 
and ‘style’ were indeed limited to the opening and the keeping-open of political 
identities, associations, discourses and constellations, then the practical result of 
Nancy’s ontology would hardly be more than a commonplace that would not have 
required the theoretical effort we have just been through. But the complexity of the 
sketched model raises expectations that there might be room for further development 
and continuation, even if they are not (yet) met in Nancy’s texts. Presumably such a 
continuation is not possible without an equally complex and accurate conception of 
what political institutions (like law or the state), processes, decisions, actors and 
parties are, what power is and how struggles of power work, how they are fostered 
and constrained in and by political and legal contexts, how legitimacy is created and 
communicated. In the following last part I want to pursue at least the ‘flashes’ of new 
approaches in Nancy’s even more recent texts. I want to suggest that there can be 
found at least the preparation of such a continuation and a ‘rehabilitation of politics’ 
– yet unfortunately without the mentioned adequately complex conception of politics 
gaining much shape.
III
In the essays ‘Des sens de la démocratie’ and ‘Tout est-il politique?’, Nancy returns 
to his diagnosis of a retreat of the (philosophico-)political. Only this time he is not 
discussing how being-in-common or being-with may be traced in that retreat, but 
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rather what and where politics is or remains in that situation. In the course of his 
reflections, he concludes that a reconsideration of the relation of politics and the 
‘common’ is at issue, a reconsideration of whether politics and being-with are 
identical or if one depends upon the other, or if there are any other forms of 
determination, exhaustion or overcoming. In a certain way, he apparently is no 
longer assuming that politics are grasped entirely by the subsumption under the 
concept of the philosophico-political and thus puts the differend of politics and 
being-with on the agenda again.
While in what was sketched above, Nancy has analyzed and criticized the double 
movement of the ancient polis as synchronous unfolding and denial of a lack of 
substantiality, subjectivity, identity and commonality, he now attempts to elucidate 
so-to-say the other side of the coin, i.e. to explore and assess the double movement as 
(re)presentation of a common (maybe self-given) principle of social order and as 
always co-present and co-presented transitoriness, instability and liquefaction of that 
same principle: 
The polis has represented itself simultaneously as a common given 
measure or as the auto-donation of a common measure, and as indefinite 
instability and a permanent putting back under construction [...] of the 
measure of the incommensurable [that is being-with, A.W.]. The measure 
has a name: Justice. Justice engages, for not being given, the exercise of 
a power (thus of counter-powers, of reversals of power, of alliances of 
power etc.). […] Politics as a giving (auto- or hetero-donation, human or 
divine) of an essence or of a common destiny has withdrawn: it has 
withdrawn as a totality or as totalization. In that sense, not everything is 
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political. But politics retraces itself as the site of exercise of power facing 
an incommensurable justice. (TP, p. 24f., my transl.)29
So it is justice that opens a space of power and relations of power or that pervades 
that space. By (re)presenting the distance between figuration, (self-)consciousness 
and (self-)control, the distance between power in general on the one side and being-
with and sense on the other side, justice can itself become a symbolization and 
articulation that can motivate and orient a praxis of treating power.
Politics is not in charge of identity and of the destiny of the common, but 
it is in charge of the – be that infinite – regulation of justice (so it has to 
cope with power). The common puts existence at stake (and thus it has to 
cope with sense). [For democracy, A.W.] it is a matter of the gap 
between sense and power. One certainly does not exclude the other, but 
does not replace it either. […] The theologico-political subsumes 
together power and sense, justice and existence, and it absorbs the 
common in the political (or vice versa).30 […] It is a matter of thinking 
the interval between the common and the political, then. (SD, p. 47f., my 
transl.)
Justice can be understood as an appeal to keep open those incommensurabilities, for 
by definition ‘it does not absorb in it all the other sites of existence’ (TP, p. 24, my 
transl.), i.e. it does not absorb the diverse constellations and figurations of 
(re)presentation of the incommensurable and unavailable being. Justice does not take 
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up, nor take in, neither does it even out nor does it assimilate those other spheres that 
are incommensurable among themselves as well, even though they are touching and 
contaminating each other. Then politics is no longer the site of a formation 
(production or surfacing) of the principium of the community – nor even of the 
presentation of the incommensurability and unavailability of that origin –, for this 
would be at stake in other spheres (‘art’, ‘religion’, ‘law’, ‘thought’, ‘science’, 
‘production’ etc.), but its task and its concern is the distance, the dis-pute and de-
bate, Auseinandersetzung.
Politics redraws itself at this place: as the site from which to keep open 
that incommensurability, and in general to maintain open the 
incommensurability of justice as well as of value. […] It is thus no longer 
a site of giving-a-form nor of giving-presence to the incommensurability 
or to some originary and final unity, in short to a “humanity”. Politics is 
in charge of space and of spacing [...], but not of figure. […] Politics 
henceforth has to understand itself as the specific site of an articulation of 
a non-unity – and of symbolization of a non-figure. […] Politics becomes 
precisely the site of detotalization. (TP, pp. 25, my transl.)
Maybe politics is not more than a framework of power struggles, the primary subject 
of which is the ‘administration’ or ‘managing’ of the community or of society. But 
then it is at the same time and basically the struggle between positions and 
figurations of the being-in-common (identities, interests etc.), and as such, as this 
struggle itself, its issue/meaning/sense is the distance between these figurations and 
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between them and the incommensurable being-with. Justice is the proliferation of the 
simultaneity of hegemonic figurations and of their instability that is implied in 
politics. 
IV
Between power and sense, maybe there is a new form of the relation of 
man to him- or herself, who could not be “his/her own end” (if that is the 
ground of democracy) without splitting up with his-/herself in order to go 
beyond. (SD, p. 48, my transl.)
Let us finally return shortly to the question of democracy. Sadly it is still not clear 
how to ‘do justice’ to the exigency of justice in the context of particular concrete 
practices of power, and what exactly and concretely it would mean to keep the space 
open. There remains much work to be done at this point and only in the results of this 
work would we be able to judge the ‘positivity’ of Nancy’s conception of politics/the 
political. But insofar as democracy can be identified as a praxis that proves to 
correspond to the mentioned ‘fractal’ symbolicity, and since in democracy, man 
(splitting up with his-/herself) persists as his/her own end, democracy could turn out 
to be, in all its power-laden responsibility in front of the obligation of justice, one 
such praxis that would indeed be resolutely political.
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1 In his article ‘Jean-Luc Nancy and the myth of the common’ (Constellations 7/2000, pp. 272-295), Andrew Norris 
researches the impact Nancy’s reflections about community have on political theory. While he subscribes to Nancy’s 
fundamental critique of every form of totalitarianism, he sees a severe lack of determination and an unsettling 
abstention when it comes to talking about those practices we are normally calling ‘political’. Neither a reader who is 
interested in political decision-making and –executing in general, nor one who is interested in emancipatory politics in 
particular can find in Nancy’s texts any orientation for the difficult situations that political actors are immerged in, he 
argues. Even a somewhat more descriptive theory of political processes is going to have difficulties applying the tools 
Nancy offers to its own work – all of which by the way corresponds rather well to Nancy’s own self-understanding (cf. 
‘Opening Address to the Centre for Philosophical Research on the Political’, in: J.-L. Nancy / Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe, 
Retreating the Political, ed. by S. Sparks, London: Routledge 1997, pp. 107-121, here pp. 108-110). Norris further 
argues that Nancy fails to see the positive aspects of a tradition of political thought that understands the admittedly 
problematic construction of collectivity to be a response to a practical and political need for such orientation. In his 
analysis, Norris refers to several of Nancy’s texts that have been published in English (‘The Nazi Myth’, in: Critical  
Inquiry 16-2/1990; The Inoperative Community, Univ. of Minnesota Press 1991 (in what follows: IC); ‘La 
Comparution/The Compearance: From the Existence of “Communism” to the Community of “Existence”’, in: Political  
Theory 20-3/1992; The Experience of Freedom, Stanford Univ. Press 1993) and to Jean-Jacques Rousseau to delineate 
the tradition of contract theories. If all this is true at least to some extent, and if Nancy does not even see himself as a 
‘political philosopher’ (cf. D. Köveker / A. Niederberger / A. Wagner, ‘Dem Politischen mangelt es an Symbolizität – 
Ein Gespräch mit Jean-Luc Nancy’, in: Information Philosophie 4/2002, pp. 33-41, here p. 39), then why should we still 
explore his texts as telling us something for politics, for political theory or for political philosophy? Is this justified by 
more than just Nancy’s continuing to use terms like ‘communism’, ‘totalitarianism’, ‘justice’? I am not sure how to 
positively answer this, but I am going to argue that Nancy opens a way to link his ontology to a certain ethics, and a 
way to spot some points that a political theory at least has to take into account when it reflects about its own categories 
and perspectives.
2 I am going to refer mostly to The Sense of the World, Univ. of Minnesota Press 1998 (in what follows: SW), Being 
Singular Plural, Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press 2000 (in what follows: BSP), ‘Des sens de la démocratie’, in: 
Transeuropéennes 17/2000, pp. 45-48 (in what follows: SD) and ‘Tout est-il politique ?’, in: Actuel Marx 28/2000, pp. 
20-26 (in what follows: TP).
3 Norris, p. 275.
4 In The Inoperative Community, Nancy takes this analysis of ‘immanentism’ even further: The collective identity 
or common subjectivity that is supposed to be established as its own ‘work’ is presented and presents itself inspired by a 
model of communion, i.e. by a model of indistinct and homogeneous continuity of its elements which in turn are taken 
up completely with their immersion in this continuity and which possess no property that would not be reflected in or 
reflections of that continuity. But this, concludes Nancy, is the continuity of pure matter, the web of uninspired atoms 
and particles that has nothing beyond, behind or between it. Thus, the truth of this community actually is death, a truth 
that has been realized in grotesque ways by totalitarian regimes. Cf. IC, pp. 12-17.
5 As Todd May points out (in Reconsidering Difference, Pennsylvania State Univ. Press 1997, esp. pp. 40-43), 
Nancy’s conception itself is not ‘operable’ in some anti-totalitarian project without self-contradiction. There may be no 
fundamental reason that would favor Nancy’s more skeptical conception of community in comparison to an essential 
one and preclude the risk of totalitarianism beyond doubt, and while ‘in the end, the idea that there may be a conceptual 
or philosophical guarantee against totalitarianism is suspect’ (p. 43), May raises an objection similar to Norris’ reproach 
of irony/cynicism (see below, note 10.): To adopt a Nancyan conception of community without having strong values of 
anti-totalitarianism that give good reasons to do so (but which is the very gesture that is criticized by it) will disarm 
political actors/communities trying to come to terms with the risk of totalitarianism. Thorsten Bonacker, on the other 
hand, argues for a ‘community of deconstruction’ that pursues a ‘politics of the common by resisting its reification’ and 
that has transformed the anti-fundamental finitude of community into a conscious and accountable political endeavor of 
opening essential communities and overcoming totalitarianism in all its forms (Cf. Th. Bonacker, ‘Die Gemeinschaft 
der Dekonstruktion. Zum normativen Gehalt liberaler Gemeinschaften’, in: A. Kern / Chr. Menke (ed.), Philosophie der  
Dekonstruktion, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 2002, pp. 264-288). Below I will be trying to sketch a communicative praxis 
or an ethos (if such can be construed without essential foundation) that is not as disarmed or disarming as May suspects 
while it does not need to draw its political effectiveness from a consciously adopted and valued project of overcoming 
totalitarianism or even only deconstructing other, essential communities, as Bonacker suggests, and I will be trying to 
elucidate points that a more political (more committed, more power-conscious, more powerful) approach could link up 
to.
6 This title is modified throughout the course of Nancy’s works, since it still seems to allude too much to an 
essential model of community. (E.g. in the term being-in-common, what would be ‘the common’ in which being 
supposedly is?) In his more recent works Nancy writes of ‘compearance’ or of ‘being-with’.
7 In ‘Ex nihilo summum (De la souveraineté)’ (in: La création du monde ou la mondialisation, Paris: Galilée 2002, 
pp. 145-172), Nancy unfolds this logic of absoluteness. While that text focuses on sovereignty and so concentrates more 
on absolute altitude, it seems to me that the logic in question would apply to absolute profundity as well. Nancy 
mentions this himself in a few places, cf. pp. 148, 162.
8 And what a being is, is precisely not determined by an essence but rather produced as the contingent or at least 
historical process of it situating itself and being situated in those openings, retracing them in turn. Thus, Andrew Norris 
writes: ‘As being-in-common we are cast into a condition of plurality. And such a condition is by definition one 
characterized by difference. [... T]he ontology of the individual is always already that of what [Nancy] terms 
“compearance”. [… I]n this mutual exposure we share an infinite lack of infinite identity. To put it as baldly as possible, 
what we have in common is precisely not a shared identity, but rather the “fact” that we are different from one another. 
Because we share this difference, we are in relation to one another.’ (Norris, p. 277) While all of this is true in a way, 
texts like Being singular plural seem to slightly shift the emphasis: The category of difference is used less and less 
prominently in the explication of ‘compearance’, presumably because it still conveys too much that it is a matter of 
different identities. Currently, Nancy tries to argue more with a spatial than with a logical model, focusing on contiguity 
and being-near (auprès de), on the spatial distance and the ‘material’ aspect of physical touch. (In what could be taken 
as an explanation of what ‘difference’ could mean in this context, Nancy tells us that ‘the alterity of the other is its 
originary contiguity with the “proper” origin.’ (BSP, p. 6, my emphasis) or that ‘the alterity of the other is its being-
origin. Conversely, the originarity of the origin is its being-other, but it is a being-other than every being for and in 
crossing through [à travers] all being. Thus, the originarity of the origin is not a property that would distinguish a being 
from all others.’ (BSP, p. 11) Also, Nancy’s argument concerning the being-with focuses in large parts on ‘with’ (avec) 
having its etymological origins in ‘near’ (apud hoc). Cf. his ‘Conloquium’, in: R. Esposito, Communitas – origine et  
destin de la communauté, Paris: puf 2000, pp. 3-10, esp. pp. 7ff.; cf. also Köveker / Niederberger / Wagner, ‘Dem 
Politischen mangelt es an Symbolizität – Ein Gespräch mit Jean-Luc Nancy’, pp 36f.) Also, see more on this below.
9 And Nancy concedes this as well: Cf. BSP, pp. 73f; ‘Ex nihilo summum’, pp. 166f.
10 Cf. Norris, p. 289. Norris adds that the requirement of ‘undergoing the experience of one’s sharing’ and the 
associated experience of a lack of foundation and of substance, the experience of self-unavailability and self-
strangeness will necessarily affect one’s own political identity. For Norris, such an ethos allows only essentially ironic 
forms of political identities, and this irony for him seems to even outweigh the mandatory respect and the required 
keeping-open: ‘It is not that respect has ceased to be a political virtue of the authentic life. It is rather a question of what 
must be respected. What must be respected is not other identities, but other ironies, other ironic undercuttings of 
political identity.’ (p. 287) In my opinion Norris is right to doubt that it is possible to maintain an all the way down 
ironical relationship to one’s ‘own’ political identity and to one’s ‘own’ political community. But it remains to be made 
clear if what Nancy suggests, or what his suggestions end up with, is indeed an attitude of irony. And this will probably 
depend on whether we are willing to more or less fundamentally revise what we understand by ‘political’ (identities, 
projects, capabilities, structures etc.).
11 In the discussion that follows, I am giving a brief account of a topos that Jacques Derrida brought up in ‘The 
Ends of Man’ (in: Margins of Philosophy, Univ. of Chicago Press 1982, pp. 111-136) and that has been discussed time 
and again by Nancy since then. It appears e.g. in ‘The “Retreat” of the Political’ (in: Nancy / Lacoue-Labarthe, 
Retreating the Political, pp. 122-137), I am referring mostly to BSP, pp. 21-28.
12 Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe (following Derrida who in turn follows Heidegger in this diagnosis) discussed this 
situation dubbed ‘the closure of metaphysics’ explicitly as early as their ‘Opening Address to the Centre for 
Philosophical Research on the Political’ from 1980 (pp. 107-112), but still in Nancy’s more recent The Sense of the 
World some diagnosis like it is present from the very beginning, but rather as a point of departure from which to embark 
on the (not so) new ‘theoretical’ endeavor of fully acknowledging it and of understanding its implications (cf. SW, pp. 
4-9). 
13 But the equality which imposes itself in this imperative has to be understood as an equality of beings that are 
different in every respect and yet at the same time as an equality that implies each time concrete and substantial claims 
– a difficulty that has among others lead Nancy to adopt the term of ‘fraternity’ as better suited, which has opened an 
ongoing debate with Derrida, for whom the latter term cannot be purged of its paternalistic-patriarchic logic. Cf. 
Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship, London: Verso 1997; Köveker / Niederberger / Wagner, ‘Dem Politischen 
mangelt es an Symbolizität – ein Gespräch mit Jean-Luc Nancy’, pp. 40f.
14 The allusion to the Schmittian title is deliberate: Maybe it is already and foremost the very attempt to find a 
definite concept of the political, that engages in a philosophico-political project and which bars any way out of the 
‘metaphysical’ trap. This is at least what I think to be Nancy’s apprehension.
15 Cf. BSP, p. 71.
16 Moments of this tradition can be found e.g. in Walter Benjamin’s and Theodor W. Adorno’s texts, more recently 
in texts by Alex Demirovic, or, again, rather differently, in Antonio Negri’s texts.
17 Cf. Norris, p. 274.
18 Nancy mentions three characteristic qualities of the ‘singuli’: their respective uniqueness, ‘whateverness’ and 
exposition. Cf. SW, pp. 68-75. These three qualities and the lack of an outside, respectively the fact that the outside as 
the empty and yet constitutive link of all the singuli is in a certain way inside (see below), result in the verdict of 
inadequateness that has to be passed on any antagonistic model of sociality (as suggested e.g. by Schmitt or 
Laclau/Mouffe). Any such model which operates with the (projected or imagined) negation of one’s own identity – 
which would then be defined e.g. by the Volk or by the web of differential relations – by a special singular that appears 
and has its effects as being an essential antagonist, can only inadequately render the profound being-in-common and 
may be undermined (also on other, more directly ‘political’, levels) by a praxis that would correspond better to it. 
19 Again, a possible dispute about whether it is the ‘between’ that constitutes the distinctness of the plural singulars 
or whether it is the other way round, that these distinct singulars constitute a spatial distance in their ‘one-another-’ 
would ignore that the point Nancy is making consists precisely in replacing the question of originarity and dependency 
with the recognition of the fact that there is always already distance and poles, between and singulars, recognition of 
the fact that we always have to deal with plural singulars. He explains that the ‘“with” is at once both more and less 
than “relation” or “bond”, especially if such relation or bond presupposes the preexistence of the terms upon which it 
relies; the “with” is the exact contemporary of its terms; it is, in fact, their contemporaneity.’ (BSP, pp. 34f.)
20 By alluding to the physical concept of quanta that tries to formulate the discontinuity of material particles, Nancy 
sketches the project of a quantum-philosophy of nature that could demonstrate workings of différance even in its 
description of natural objects (cf. SW, p. 62f). The nothing that is between the quanta is in fact nothing, not another sort 
of ‘particle’ itself, but it is the ‘transcendence’ that opens up the solid and continuous totality which pure immanentism 
would be. Without that transcendent ‘nothing’, no ‘contact’ would be possible, but there would just be continuity of 
some ‘one’.
21 Nancy writes about the passibilité that the world is, and in doing so, he plays with a blending of possibilité, the 
possibility of appearances and of (se) passer, which has a whole cluster of meanings ranging from ‘to happen’ (an 
event) or ‘to become present’ (a barely perceptible detail), over ‘to go by’ (time) or ‘to pass’ (from one place to 
another), to finally even ‘to refrain from’. In the present text, ‘appearing’ is supposed to reflect at least some of those 
allusions. (Cf. SW, pp. 59-63.)
22 By using the term aréalité, Nancy wants to point us to the fact that there are at issue at the same time the 
material-located-spatial constellation of extended singularities (areal); the materiality and the corporal fact of collision 
or of being-directed-at-one-another of the singularities (réalité du à); and the nothingness, the imperceptible rien of the 
res that constitutes the between and in which the being-with is inscribed (a-réalité). (Cf. again SW, pp. 59-63.)
23 SW, p. 55.
24 I cannot go into more details here, but for Nancy’s own discussion of this argument see BSP, pp.83-88 and SM, 
pp. 118ff.
25 Nancy’s concept of the symbolic takes its starting point with the ancient use of sym-bola, i.e. of corresponding 
fragments of pottery that were given to persons parting as a sign of identification and as a pledge of mutual obligation.
26 And actually the French ‘representer’ conveys already more of that which Nancy has in mind than the English ‘to 
represent’ or the German ‘darstellen/vorstellen’ (let alone ‘stellvertreten’) do. Nancy’s critique can be found more 
explicitly and carried out as the main issue in texts like ‘Scène’ (together with Ph. Lacoue-Labarthe, in: Nouvelle Revue  
de Psychanalyse, 46/1992, pp. 73-98) or ‘La représentation interdite’ (in: J.-L. Nancy, Au fond des images, Paris: 
Galilée 2003, pp. 57-99).
27 There’s a full chapter (‘Art, a Fragment’, pp. 123-139) in The Sense of the World that discusses the question of 
what ‘fragmentary’ means. Nancy introduces the concept of the ‘fractal’, to make aware of the dynamic and iterating, 
i.e. deferring character of the boundaries. He also discusses questions of art and technology and of the ‘coming-to-the-
world’ of the singulars. I can not cover this here.
28 Quite consequently, already ‘The Inoperative Community’ is followed by an essay called ‘Literary Communism’ 
(pp. 71-81) that discusses this idea. It is taken up again and developed further in later texts as well (cf. SW, pp. 16-21, 
118-122; BSP, pp. 85-88) – where, for obvious reasons, Nancy also insists that ‘style’ is not to be understood in a 
simplifying, philological way.
29 This is not without similarities to Jacques Rancière’s thoughts about politics – which present politics as an 
opening of a ‘partition of the sensible’. Especially in his Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, Univ. of Minnesota 
Press 1998, the argument about the factual measuring and allocation implied in any order of the common is emphasized 
and then confronted with the naming of a part(y) that is incommensurable to the present ‘partition’, whereby the 
possibility of a new measure and of a new partition is opened. And it is this very moment of opening (and not the old 
nor the new order) that Rancière calls politics. While the delineating of many of the differences to Nancy would require 
a more in-depth discussion than I can cover here, two traits are rather evident: Firstly, Nancy is much more skeptical 
than Rancière about a tight link between the order of the common and politics, and secondly he is much more 
‘generous’ as to which events can be classified as ‘political’, insofar as for him – emphasizing the praxis of 
communication – they are better understood as day-to-day events while for Rancière they are rather exceptional. Maybe 
the reason for both of these differences lies in that Nancy seems to see a much greater indeterminacy and instability in 
every order, in every articulation and in meaning and sense in general.
30 And it is again this theologico-political (note that it is no longer called philosophico-political) subsumption that 
would raise expectations of obtaining insights into political, emancipatory, justice-oriented praxis by exploring the 
being-with. 
